Search in Co-Wiki

Chore division

game-theory 2631 tokens 14 outbound links

Chore division

Chore division is often called fair division of bads, in contrast to the more common problem called "fair division of goods" (an economic bad is the opposite of an economic good). Another name is dirty work problem. The same resource can be either good or bad, depending on the situation. For example, suppose the resource to be divided is the back-yard of a house. In a situation of dividing inheritance, this yard would be considered good, since each heir would like to have as much land as possible, so it is a cake-cutting problem. But in a situation of dividing house-chores such as lawn-mowing, this yard would be considered bad, since each child would probably like to have as little land as possible to mow, so it is a chore-cutting problem.

Some results from fair-cake-cutting can be easily translated to the chore-cutting scenario. For example, the divide-and-choose procedure works equally well in both problems: one of the partners divides the resource to two parts that are equal in his eyes, and the other partner chooses the part that is "better" in his eyes. The only difference is that "better" means "larger" in cake-cutting and "smaller" in chore-cutting. However, not all results are so easy to translate.

Proportional chore-cutting The definition of proportional-division in chore-cutting is the mirror-image of its definition in cake-cutting: each partner <math>i</math> should receive a piece <math>X_i</math> that is worth, according to his own personal disutility function, at most <math>1/n</math> of the total value (where <math>n</math> is the total number of partners): :<math>\forall i: V_i(X_i) \leq V_i(Whole)/n</math>

Most protocols for proportional-cake-cutting can be easily translated to the chore-cutting. For example: To use the [[last-diminisher]] protocol: ask an agent to cut a piece worth exactly <math>1/n</math> for him. If any other agent feels that this piece is too large, then he can cut it smaller until it is worth exactly <math>1/n</math> for him, and so on. The "last diminisher" receives the piece, which is worth exactly <math>1/n</math> for him and at most <math>1/n</math> for the others. To use the even–paz-protocol: ask each agent to mark the half-value line, making sure all lines are parallel. Cut the cake in the median of the lines, divide the agents to two groups of <math>n/2</math> agents, and let each half recursively divide the piece that does NOT contain its line.

Equitable and exact chore-cutting Procedures for equitable division and exact division work equally well for cakes and for chores, since they guarantee equal values. An example is the Austin moving-knife procedure, which guarantees each partner a piece that he values as exactly 1/n of the total.

<span id='ef'>Envy-free chore-cutting</span> The definition of envy-freeness in chore-cutting is the mirror-image of its definition in cake-cutting: each partner <math>i</math> should receive a piece <math>X_i</math> that is worth, according to his own personal disutility function, at most as much as any other piece: :<math>\forall i,j: V_i(X_i) \leq V_i(X_j)</math>

For two partners, divide-and-choose produces an envy-free chore-cutting. However, for three or more partners, the situation is much more complicated. The main difficulty is in the trimming – the action of trimming a piece to make it equal to another piece (as done e.g. in the Selfridge–Conway protocol). This action cannot be easily translated to the chore-cutting scenario.

Oskui's discrete procedure for three partners Reza Oskui was the first who suggested a chore-cutting procedure for three partners. His work was never formally published; It is described in pages 73–75. It is similar to the Selfridge–Conway protocol, but more complicated: it requires 9 cuts instead of 5 cuts.

Below, the partners are called Alice, Bob and Carl.

Case 1. Bob's trims are weaker. I.e, if Bob trims X2 to X2' and X3 to X3', such that both X2' and X3' are for him as small as X1, then Carl thinks X1 is still a smallest piece – weakly smaller than X2' and X3'. Then, the following partial division is envy-free: Carl gets X1; Alice gets the smaller of X2' and X3' (both are smaller than X1 for her); Bob gets the piece not taken by Alice (both are equal to X1 for him). Now we have to divide the trimmings E2 and E3. For each trimming, the following is done: Bob cuts it to three equal pieces. * The agents choose pieces in the order: Carl, Alice, Bob. Carl is not envious since he chose first; Bob is not envious since he cut; Alice is not envious since she had a (negative) advantage over Carl: in the first step, Carl took X1, while Alice took a piece that is smaller than X1 by max(E2,E3), while in the last step, Alice took two pieces that are worth at most (E2+E3)/2.

Case 3. Bob's trim is weaker in X2, and Carl's trim is weaker in X3. I.e, if Bob trims X2 to X2' which is equal to X1 for him, and Carl trims X3 to X3' which is equal to X1 for him, then: For Carl: X2' >= X1 = X3' For Bob: X3' >= X1 = X2' Then, the following partial division is envy-free: Alice gets the smaller of X2' and X3' (both are smaller than X1 for her); Bob gets either X2' (if it was not taken by Alice) or X1 (otherwise); * Carl gets either X3' (if it was not taken by Alice) or X1 (otherwise). The trimmings, E2 and E3, are divided in a similar way to Case 1.

Oskui also showed how to convert the following moving-knife procedures from cake-cutting to chore-cutting: [[stromquist-moving-knives-procedure]] The rotating-knife procedure. suggested a different procedure for three partners. It is simpler and more symmetric than Oskui's procedure, but it is not discrete, since it relies on a moving-knife procedure. Their key idea is to divide the chores into six pieces and then give each partner the two pieces that they feel are at least as small as the pieces the other players receive.

Peterson and Su extend their continuous procedure to four partners. It is analogous to the brams–taylor-procedure and uses the same idea of irrevocable advantage. Instead of trimming, they use adding from reserve.

Dehghani et al.'s discrete and bounded procedure for any number of partners Peterson and Su gave a moving knife procedure for 4-person chore division. Dehghani et al. provided the first discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for chore division among any number of agents.

Procedures for connected pieces The following procedures can be adapted to divide a bad cake with disconnected pieces: * [[robertson–webb-rotating-knife-procedure]] calculate the [[price-of-fairness]] in chore division when the pieces have to be connected.

Applications It may be possible to use chore division procedures to divide up the work and cost of reducing climate change among nations. Problems occur with morals and getting cooperation between nations. However, using chore division procedures reduces the need for a supra-national authority to partition and oversee work by those nations.

Another use for chore division would be in the Rental harmony problem.

References ## See also * [[envy-free-cake-cutting]] * Bad (economics) * [[rental-harmony]]