Trigger strategy
Trigger strategy
In game-theory, a trigger strategy is any of a class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game. A player using a trigger strategy initially cooperates but punishes the opponent if a certain level of defection (i.e., the trigger) is observed.
The level of punishment and the sensitivity of the trigger vary with different trigger strategies.
Trigger strategies *[[grim-trigger]] (the punishment continues indefinitely after the other player defects just once) *[[tit-for-tat]] (the punishment continues as long as the other player defects) *[[tit-for-tat|Tit for two tats]] (a more forgiving variant of tit for tat)
References ;Textbooks and general reference texts
- Vives, X. (1999) Oligopoly pricing, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (readable; suitable for advanced undergraduates.)
- Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (An organized introduction to industrial organization)
;Classical paper on this subject
- Friedman, J. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames, Review of Economic Studies 38, 1–12. (The first formal proof of the folk-theorem-(game-theory)).